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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SILVER KING C'OALITION MINES
CO~fpANY, a corporation, and CO·NTINENTAL CASUALTY c·O~fP ANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiffs

vs.

Case No.

7171

IND'US'TRIAL COMMIS~SION OF U·Tl\H
and SUSAN J. MIT·OHELL, mother of
Lester A. Mitchell, deceased,

Defoowarnts.

PLAINTIFF S·' BRIE·F
1

This case and case No. 7172. in this court involve
the same plaintiffs and very similar facts. Both cases
demonstrate the arbitrary and capricious action of the
Industrial Cnmmission in making an award after refusing an autopsy. In both cases the employee was. dead
and buried before we ever heard of the case, in both
cases the medical evidence fails to measure up, to the
requirements of our statute, and in both cases. the record
demonstrates the high-handed manner in which the Industrial Commission pToceeded in order to find against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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us. We believe the court will find it helpful to consider
the two eases. together. The unfairness and arbitrariness
of the Commission is. apparent in each case, but when
they are considered together it is more th'an wpparent
that the Industrial ·Commission has. adopted a course
of p;rocedure which forecloses emp·loyers from having
fair and impartial hearings.
Both cases are here on Certiorari from the Industrial Commission to review awards of the Commission
granting compensation on account of death claimed from
an occupational dise·ase, to-wit: silicosis. While the circumstances, facts and applicable law are in many respects similar, we have felt that it would be more helpful to the court to consider each case in a brie.f devoted
to that case rather than to attempt to ·consolidate the
two cases in one brief.

Lester A. Mitchell was an emp,loyee of the plaintiff
Silver King Coalition Mines Com·pany at its mine in
Park City, and the plaintiff Continental c~asualty Company carries the W orlrman 's Compensation insurance
for the mining comp·any. Mr. Mitchell left his employment with the mining company on D:e·cember 10 or 12,
1946 because he was not physically able to perform his
work. (R. 22, 38) He died June 6, 1947. (R. 3, 38)
It is not clear how long he worked for the plaintiff mining ·comp·any. The application for compensation, (R. 3),
states that he worked for the mining company from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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July 28, 1937, to Decemher 13, 1946. His associate, A. J.
Frantz, stated that he was off for one year during 1938
and then worked until December 13, 1946. (R. 37, 38)
A period of eight years and five months.. Although Dr.
Wherritt said that the deceased had mentioned that he
worked for the nrining company or in the area around
Park City for twenty-two years, that was only the doctor's impression, and he is not sure of it. (R. 28, 29)
The definite evidence shows that he worked a maximum
of eight years and five months which was not continuous.
His continuous employment pTior to his death was eight
years.
Up until the last few months he appeared normal
and active. (R. 22) On December 9·, however, he was
examined by Dr. Wherritt, and his condition was such
that he discontinued work because he was physically
unable to work. (R. 23) The immediate cause of his
death was congestive heart failure. (R. 24) At the
hearing Dr. Wherritt said the heart failure was due to
silicosis, although the Commission was advised before
the hearing that Dr. Wherritt's death certifi'Cate did
not give silicosis as a cause of death. (R. 6;5) The doctor, however, did not take any x-rays but had them
taken by Dr. Viko. He does not do that work. (R. 24)
Five or six months before his death Mr. Mitcheli developed drop:sy which was directly due to his he'art
trouble, which heart trouble gradually grew worse as
time went on. (R. 25) Dr. Wherritt came to the conclusion that the man had silicosis because he couldn't
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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expand his lungs and was short of breath. He conceded
that silicosis must be very pronounced or extensive to
affect the heart. (R. 2:6, 27) He also stated that any
disease of the heart would cause shortness of breath
and lack of expansion in the lungs. Dr. Wherritt said
you couldn't tel'! from physical examination alone that
the heart trouble is due to silicosis-, and he conceded that
all he did was make a physical examination. (R. 28)
Dr. Wherritt first examined the man December 9, 1946,
(R. 23), although he states that he had known him as a
neighbor for many years but had not examined him for
ten years. (R. 21) He also stated that he was not in a
position to state what degree of silicosis Mr. Mitchell
had. (R. 25)
No claim was ever made for comp1ensation until
September 29, 1947. (R. 3) The doctor's report was
not filed until July 12, 1947, and the first that plaintiffs
ever heard of Mr. Mitchell at all was a week or so after
his death, (R. 46), by means of a letter from the Secretary of the ~ocal union dated June 12, 1947, and received June 13, 1947. (R. 60) Mr. Peterson, the representative of the plaintiff insuran-ce company, saw Mr.
P'ayne, the signer of the letter, exhibit 60, after he had
received the letter and asked why we were not notified
of these occupational disease cases until after the man
had died, and Mr. Payne s~aid that he had informed
claimants generally in that area in connection with occupational disease not to report the case until after the
man had died, and then in case an autopsy was requested to deny the autopsy. (R. 46, 47)
1
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Dr. ''Therritt sent the n1an to Dr. Viko, (R. 24), who
exan1ined the deceased only once on December 17, 1946,
and the result of his examination lead the doctor to the
opinion that the man had siiicosis and cor pulmonale
due to chronic lung disease. (R. 30) Cor pulmonale is
enlarged heart displaced to the right due to chronic
lung disease. (~R. 32, 34, 35) (Commonly called right
sided heart failure.) He was of the o~pinion that the
silicosis was not severe enough in itself to cause disablement, ''but with the heart disease he was totally
disabled.'' The doctor stated that there could be one
other factor in the distortion of the chest, an old empyema, due to pneumonia which the man had many
years ago. (R. 30, 31)
The Inter-Mountain Ciinic, Dr. Viko's clinic, took
x-rays of Mr. Mitchell December 17, 1946, No. 28863,
and they are now here in this court as Exhibits in that
case. (R. 31) The most striking thing rubout the x-rays
is the heart. It is generally enlarged, and the doctor was.
of the opinion that he had cor p.ulmonale and that he
had diffused nodular silicosis. (R. 31) The doctor was
of the opinion that silicosis pro·duced cor pulmonale
(enlargement of the heart), (R. 3:3), but there was also
emphysema, or air in the chest cavity, present and that
also contributed to the enlargement of the heart, and
the emphysema and the silicosis combined caused the
1

cor pulmonale, and which one is predominate would be
hard to say. (R. 33, 34) From the x-rays alone it would
be difficult to say that there is sufficient evidence of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

silicosis to cause heart trouble. (R. 34) The silicosis
shown by his x-rays is not as severe as third degree
silicosis, and there is no area of conglomeration. By
themselves the pictures leave some doubt as to whether
silicosis was of sufficient severity to cause cor pulmonale. (R. 3:5) Dr. Viko conceded that an autopsy would
show the cause of death and vositively confirm the degree
of silicosis, determine the type of heart disease and
would rule out the possibility of any other heart disease.
Without an autopsy the degree of silicosis is. uncertain.
(R. 36-)
Dr. Viko apparently was of the school of thought
that believes that cor pulmonale can be caused by sili·cosis even when the silicosis is not of sufficient severity
to lbe · disabling and the x-rays show no area of conglomeration. Dr. Viko did not produce x-rays which
disclose nor did he testify his. x-rays disclose discrete
nodules of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated throughout both lungs. He .also conceded that the greater the
silicosis the greater the probability of cor puhnonale.
(R. 85)
Dr. Richards testified, and as will appear, he is. of
the school of thought that holds that heart trouble does
not come from silicosis, and that if it could the silicosis
would have to be of the greatest severity, would have to
be disabling and would be cleariy disclosed by x-ray.
IT:here are two schools of thought, one of which is. re~
ognized by Dr. Viko and not recognized by our statute,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the other recognized by Dr. Richards and by our
statute.
Dr. Richards is one of the outstanding specialists
on silicosis in the inter-mountain country. He is a practitioner of twenty-five years, e:x:perienced with this disease and in taking x-rays. of it and interpreting the
x-rays. (R. 40) In case No. 717'2 the a,vp'licant's attorney conceded (R. 131 in that case) that in the Western
states there is no one who has had as mueh practice and
experience with silicosis as Dr. Richards, and that he is
a medical expert of great and unusual talent. Dr. Richards examined the x-rays taken by Dr. Viko's., clinic,
and those x-rays did not disclose to him any evidence
of pulmonary heart disease. There is an enlargement of
the heart, and there is some silicosis present. There is
diffused nodulation throughout, especially in the right
chest, but only a moderate amount of nodulation in the
left chest. (R. 41) T·here is no nodulation similarly disseminated throughout both lungs. From an x-ray standpoint you cannot say that this is silicosis, but from the
man's history you could interpret these films as. silicosis.
There is enough suggestion of silicosis in the films to
require a further and positive diagnosis, and if the man
is dead, the only way to make that determination would
be by autopisy. If an autopsy were denied, "I would say
you would be in a pre·carious state to make a diagnosis
of silicosis.'' (R. 41, 42) Even if this. should be silicosis
it is not the type of silicosis that .woul~d cause de·ath.
Whether or not silicosis can cause heart disease is an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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extremely controversial question. Those who are most
acquainted with silicosis do not feel that the amount of
silicosis shown here, if it is silicosis, is the type that
causes heart failure. The only positive way to determine it is by autopsy, and in the absence of autopsy it is
purely speculative and controversial. (R. 43) In answer
to leading qu~stions from the Commissioner Dr. Richards repeated that in his experience and iri the contacts
he had had, "I would say provided this is silicosis, it is
not the typ~e of silicosis that we see as a causative factor
of cor pulmonale,'' and he has. never seen a case of cor
pulmonale with that amount of silicosis. The x-rays
show only a minimum of silicosis, if it is silicosis at all.
('R. 44, 45) The Commissioner argued with and lead
the doctor through several pages of the record, but the
doctor concluded: ''It is too easy to make a diagnosis
of a situation and then reason back to some findings to
cause that situation. The trouble with this silicosis is
these controversial things, that anyone. who is thoroughly
acquainted with silicosis could not accept that as a diagnosis of silicosis. and say it is an ideological f'actor in
cor pulmonale." (R. 45) We shall later in the brief
refer to our statute defining silicosis and show that
the pattern of silicosis is always the same ; that it is
uniform in everybody; that in fact Dr. Viko himself
stated: ''The only question that could arise is whether
the silicosis was of sufficient degree to produce cor
puhnonale. Perhaps it is not by itself; but with a considerable degree of emphysema sufficient to cause cor
pulmonale there might be a question whether the old
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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distortion of the che-st from empyema might be a factor
I could not say." (R. 32) Dr. Richards' statement that
the nodulation is not similarly disseminated throughout
both lungs is not disputed, and from the record it is.
undisputed that Dr. Viko conceded that it was questionable "rhether the silicosis p:resent was of sufficient
severity to cause cor pulmonale. Dr. Richards was positive that it was not of sufficient severity, and both doctors agreed that the positive way of determining the
question was by autopsy.
After we learned of the existence of Mr. Mitchell,
which as a matter o.f fact was not until he had passe·d
out of existence and was buried, and after we had 1exhausted means of learning the cause of death, our rep-resentative wrote to Mrs. Mitchell., the ap·plicant, Exhibit 2, (R. 47, 61) calling her attention to the fact that
the cause of death was doubtful; that he had exhausted
his efforts to determine the cause of death, and that the
only way it could ··be determined was by autop·sy. He
requested her to allow an autop,sy and stated that if the
autopsy s-howed silicosis, payments would be made immediately. To this letter Mrs. Mitchell replied, Exhibit
3, (R. 47, 62) refusing an autopsy erroneously secure
in her belief and for the reason that the doctor said
it was too late because Mr. Mitchell had been dead six
months. Mr. Peterson wrote her again, Exhibit 4, (R.
48, 63), requesting autopsy and advising her that Dr.
Carlquist of the L.D.S. Hospital and Dr. Ogilvie of the
St. Marks Hospital advised that the autopsy could he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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successfully performed. Mrs. Mitchell for no reason
again refused the autopsy, Exhibit 5, (R. 48, 64), and
we then applied to the Industrial Commission for an
autop'SY setting forth the facts very fully. In the letter
to the Commission we called attention to the fact that Dr.
Wherritt's death certificate said the death was due to
congestive heart failure' but did not say anything at all
about silicosis. We called attention of the Commission
to the fact that there was doubt that the man had died
from silicosis; that it was po'ssible for a successful
autorp~sy, hut the Commission refused to allow it. (Exhibits 6 and 7, R. 48, 49·, 65, 66)
As soon as we learne·d of the death we began making
investigations. We interviewed Dr. Viko who said that
there was an indication of silicosis, that sputum tests.
would have to be taken to make the case more conClusive
and gave his permission to have the x-rays examined by
Dr. Richards. D·r. Viko told Mr. Peterson that autopsy
was the only thing that would definitely confirm the cause
of death. (R. 49·, 50) The x-rays were submitted to Dr.
Richards with the result as shown.
!The applicant testified as to the degree of her dependency on the deceased, and about all that one can
glean from the record is that he paid for the food they
both ate and the taxes on her home, and that at one time
he had the house fixed up, and that he paid for the fuel.
She owned the home. She paid the light bill, bought her
own clothes, and has an income from social security.
:T~here is not a word of evidence as to how much he conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tributed to her, nor that she was dependent upon h~m.
In this state of the record the Commission made an
award in the same obj-e~tionable manner it did in case
No. 7172 in a total sum and made absolutely no finding
at all of dependency. Petition for rehearing was duly
made, (R. 14), denied, (R. 16) The cas·e is here by certiorari.

ST·ATEMENT OF E·RRORS
1. The decision of the Commission is not sup·ported
by substantial comrpetent evidence having p·robative
value.
2. The Commission acted without or in excess ·Of
its powers.
3. The Commission abused its dis-cretion in refusing an autopsy in this case.
4. The award even if properly supported is not
in conformance with the O·ccupational Dise·ase L•aw of
the State of Utah.
APPLICABLE lSlTAT'UTO;RY PROVlSIONS

U.C.A. 1943
42-la-·29.

SILICOSIS-DEFINED.

"For the purpose of this act 'silicosis' is
defined as a chronic. disease of the lungs caused
by the prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide dust
(Si02) characterized by small discrete nodules
of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated throughSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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out both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray
pattern, and by variable clinical manifestations.''
42.-l'a-47. AU'TOPSY IN DEATH CIJAIMS.
"On the filling of a claim for comp.ensation
for death from an occupational disease where in
the opinion of the commission it is ·necessary to
accurately and scientifically ascertain the cause
of death, an autorpsy may he ordered by any member ·of the commission and shall be made by a
person designated by such member of the commission. The person reques:ting any· such autopsy
shall pay the charge of the physi~ian making the
same. Any person interested may designate a
duly licensed physician to attend such autop.sy,
and the findings of the physician p~erforming the
autopsy shall be filed with the commission and
shall be a public record. All proceedings for compensation shall he susp~ended upon refusal of a
claimant or claimants to permit such autopsy
when so ordered. Where an autopsy has been
·periormed pursuant to an order of any member
of the commission no cause of action shall lie
against any person, firm or corpoTation for participating in or requesting such autopsy.''
42-la-25, as amended by Laws of 1945. COMPENSATIO·N FOR SILI:CQ:S.IS..--JSCHEDULE o·F
AMO·UNT~S-INCREA!SE OF P~YME·N·T·S-DEATP
BENEFIT:S 'T'O· D·E'PENDENiT·S.
* • •
'' (h) In case of death from silicosis the
·dependents of the deceased employee shall receive
, the difference between the amount paid lpirior to
death, if any, for the total disability as in p'aragraph (a) of this section set forth, and a maxiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mum sum to be determined as follows: A maximum of not to exceed $3,000 if such disability or
death, whichever first occurs, results in the ca-lendar month of July, 1945, and if such disability or
death, whichever first occurs, results in August,
1945, a maximum of not to exceed $3.,050 and after
August, 19·45, the maximum amount shall increase
at the rate of $50 p·er calendar month and the
maximum amount shall be determined in all cases
by the month in which the disability or death,
\vhichever first occurs, results, provided, however, that in no case of death from silicosis shall
the employer be required to piay compensation in
excess of the difference between the sum of $5,000
and the amount paid, if any, for total disability
prior to the occurrence of death. The comp·ensation for death shall be paid to such dependents
at four week intervals at the rate of $16 per week
plus 5% for each de~pendent minor child under
the age of 18 years, up to and including 5 dependent minor children.''
)

BENEFI'T;S-TO· WH·OIM PAID-MANNER
-TERMINATION.
~2-1a-33.

'' • • • Should any dependent of a deceased
employee die during the period covered by such
weekly payments, the right of such dependent to
compensation under this act shall cease; provided, that should a widow who is th·e sole dependent of the deceased employee, and who is
receiving the benefits of tnis act, remarry during
the period covered by such weekly payments, she
shall be entitled to receive in a lump: sum P'ayment one-third of the benefits remaining unpaid
at the time of such remarriage.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In all cases where the weekly payment is
increased 5% or 10% for each dependent minor
child such increase shall cease at the death, marriage, attainment of the age of eighteen years, or
termination of dependency of each such chiid. ''
The rules of evidence and the provisions for review
are quite different in the O·ccupational Disease Law than
they are in the Workman's Compensation Act as follows:
OCCUPATIONAL D'lSEASE
42-1a-39. Id. PROCEDURE
-EXTENT OF REVIEW.
"* * * The review sh.a:ll not
be extended further than to
determine·:
(a) Whether or not the
Commission acted without or
in exces.s of its powers.
(b) Wheth.er or not findings of fact are supported by
substantial competent evidenc·e having probative
value."
42-1a-43. RULES ·OF PR·OCEDURE.
"* *. * Hear-say evidence
shall not be admissible. No
party to any proceeding shall
be prejudiced hy his or its
failure to make objections or
to take exceptions at any
hearing.''

WORKMEN'S ~COM
PENSATION
42-1-78. ld.
'' * * * The review shall
not be extended further than
to determine:
(1) Wheth·er or not the
Commission acted without
or in excess of its powers.
(2) If findings of fact
are made, whether or not
such findings of fact support
the award under review."
42-1-82. RULE'S 0 F EVIDEN:CE BEFORE COMMISSION.
1

~Contains

no s'uch provisions as ·those opposite and
permits Commis·sion to make
inve:stigations according to
its judgment.

ARGUME·NT
~The

facts in the other case No. 7172 in this court
differ from this case in detail, but the two cases essentially give rise to the same principles of law. A conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sideration of the cases involve two main subjects: (1)
Is there substantial competent evjdence having p~robative
value to support the findings of the Commission and (2)
Did the C·ommission abuse its discretion in refusing an
autopsy in this. case~
In this case as in the other case there is n·o evidence
whatever that in the plaintiff mine deceased was exposed for five years in the last ten to silicon dioxide dust.
However, the foregoing two questions are also relied
upon in this case as in the other case to annul the award
of the C:ommission because they demonstrate not only
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Commission, but a complete lack of understanding by the
Commission of the O'Ccupational Disease L~aw and the
elements essentia'l to a finding of death or disab~ility
unde-r its provirsions.
Under the first heading naturally come the questions does the evidence comply with our statutory definition of silicosis and what actually is the substance of
the evidence as disclosed by the testimony of ·all the witnesses. Under heading II arises the ques·tion of whether
our autopsy statute has any value whatever and whether
part~ies have any rights whatever under it in view of the
attitude of the present Commission. In passing may we
re-mark at this p.oint that never before have auto~psies
been refused by the Commission. The Commi~ssion heretofore always has taken the position that it s·ought for
and required all the evidence it could secure in order
to p·rotect the rights of both parties and make certain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
as far as possible that actual justice was done by the
Commission. Never until now under the Occupationai
Disease Law has the Commission considered itself to be
the guardian of the sentiments ·or wh'ims of one party
against the substantial rights of the opponent. Never
until now has the Commission taken the position that its
function is to guard one party from possible adverse
evidence in order to make an award against the other
party. Also under heading II comes the point of the
wording of the Comm'ission's award.

I.
IS THERE SUB·S~TANTIAL CO·MPE'TENT EVID·EN·CE HAVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO SUP-.,
PORT T·HE FIND·INGS OF T·H'E COMMIS SION¥
1

At the outset it may he well to bear in mind that
tuberculosis itself is not an occup~ational disease ; also
that in case of disability or death from silicosis when
complicated with any disease other than pulmonary
tuberculosis, compensation shall be reduced as p~rovided
in Section 51. (42-la-~30). Heart disease caused the de·ath
here. Silicosis as defined by our statute is not even
present, and even the evidence of silicosis fails to establish it as the cause of death.
The words ''substantial com'P'etent evidence having
probative value" have clear and well defined meanings.
The Federal c·ourts in construing the National Labor
Rel~tions Act have many times had occasion to define
''substantial evidence.'' It has frequently been contende·d
that the court must accept the findings of the Board on
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matters of fact. The courts uniformly hold that they are
not required to accept the board's findings unles:s. supported by ''substantial evidence.'' In Ma~ional Dabor
Relat'ions Board vs. Un~on Racific Stages, 99 Fed. (2)
153 at 177 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had thisi
to say, particularly appropriate in view of the state· of
the record here, with reference to what constitutes sub~
stantial evidence.
''It is suggested that this court should accept
the findings of the Board; that contradictions,
inconsistencies, and e-rroneous inferences are immune from criticism or attack * * *. But the
courts have not construe-d this language as compelling the accep:tance of findings arriv·ed ~at by
acceptilng part of the ~evicZenCie and t.ot,ally disrega'ldilng other convincimg ev~denc1e.
*

**

" '·Substantial ·evidence' means more than a
mere scintilla. It is of substantial and relevant
consequence and excludes vague, uncertain, or
irrelevant matter. It imv,lies a quality of proof
which induces conviction and makes an imp·ression on reason. It means that the one weighing
the evidence takes into consideration .all the facts
presented to him and ~all reasonable inferences,
deductions an·d conclusions to be drawn therefrom
and, -considering them in their entirety and relation to each other, arrives at a fixed conviction.
''The rule of substamtial evidenoe is one of
fundamental importance and is the dtvidimg liwe
betwe-en Zaw and ,arbit11ary P'ow,er. Testimony is
the raw material out of which we construct truth
and, unless 'all of it is w1eighed in its totality,
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errors W'ill result arnd g;ne1at irnjustices
w·novug ht. '' (Italics rudded)
And in the case of

National L1wb,or

A.p~alachtian

be

Ene1ctnc Power Co. vs.

ReZat~ons B01a~d,

93 Fed. (2) 985, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals at page 989 says concerning the test of substantial evidence ''and the test
is not satisfied by evidence which merely creates a suspicion or which amounts to no more than a s·cintilla o~r

which gives equal

swppo~rt

to

inwo'nSiSI~evnt

ilnferences. ''

( rtalics jad·ded)
Of course, in order for evidence to he competent it
must be giyen by one qualified to speak. When a doctor
admits, as did Dr. Viko, that the silicosis shown by his
x-rays is not third degree silicosis. and there is no area
of conglomeration, that it is hard to say which disease is
predominate in causing heart trouble; that the only
question that can arise ill: this cas-e is to whether the
silic'Osis was of sufficient degree to produce heart
trouble, and that without autopsy the degree of silicosis
present is uncertain, (R. ·30-3'6), such evidence is neither
substantial or competent to prove that death was due to
silicosis. This was particularly true when the doctor
saw the patient only once and that one time was six
months before his death. It is p-articularly questionable whether such evid~nce is competent when it
appears from the record that there are two schools
of thought as to whether silicosis can cause heart
trouble at all, and it is undisputed that in order
to cause heart trouble it must he in the most advanced
stage which is not present here. Also it is questionable
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whether the doctor's testimony is competent when he
belongs to a school of thought that is not recognized by
our statutory definition of silicosis. And certainly, evidence has no probative value where it is given either
by an incompetent person or where the evidence itself
discloses that it does not prove the fact for which it was.
offered.
Our statute as we have seen is much more exp~icit
in Occupational Disease cases than it is in W orlanen 's
Compens'ation cases. Not only is the commission expressly ~~r9hibited froni accepting hearsay testimony in
Occupational Disease cases, (4l-la-4:H, supra), but the
findings of the Commission must be supported by sub~
stantial comp·etent evidence having probative value. ( 42la-39h) Also the Commission is not left free under
our statute to accept the opinion of either one of two
schools o'f thought with reference to silicosis. The Legislature has already decl·ared that in this state silicosis must
be established by proof of '' sma~ discrete nodules of
fibrous tissue similarly disseminatHd throughout both
lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray pattern, * * ·* '' ( 42la-29) The statute also defines silicosis as a chronic
disease of the lungs. caused by a prolonged inhalation of
silicon dioxide dust. Aside from the fact that there is
no evidence whatever in this case that the deceased ·su·ffered a chronic disease of the lungs caused by the prolonged inhalation of sili·con dioxide dust in the Silver
King Mine, it is our contention that there likewise is no
X-ray ·evidence showing a characteristic X-ray pattern
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as a result of small discrete nodules of fibrous tissue
similarly disseminated throughout both lungs. It will
be noted that the statutory definition agrees with Dr.
Richards, that the pattern must be the same in all individuals; that the nodulation must be equally distributed in both lungs; that there must be pTesent existing
nodulation disclosed by x-ray, and that in the ahsence of
these elements there can be no finding of silicosis.
The testimony discloses in this case as it did in
Case No. 7172 that there are two schools of thou·ght, one
holding that cor pulmonale is never cause;d by silicosis.,
and the other school of thought holding that it can be
caused by silicosis. Both schools of thought, however,
agree that in order for silicosis to be a cause of cor pulmonale the silicosis must be very severe. Our Legislature undoubtedly had before it the views of these two
schools. I~t adop~ted the view of the s'Chool of thought
that holds that there can he no silicosis unless there are
''small discrete nodules of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated throughout both lungs causing a characteristic
X-ray p~attern.'' That is, the L~egislature adopted the
school of thought relpresented by Dr. Richards, if there
is a characteristic X-ray pattern it must he the same in
all individuals. The p~attern is uniform. If there must be
s~mall discrete nodules similarly disseminated thr:ovu.ghovut
both lungs, then each lung must be the same and show
the same p~attern in order for there to be a diagnosis
of silicosis under our statute. The ch-aracteristic X-ray
pattern is not p~resent here. Dr. Viko did not testify tha;t
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it is, and Dr. Richards positively testified that there was
no characteristic X--ray pattern here. Dr. Viko conceded
that his X-rays sh'owed an enlarged heart, but he saw
only a few scattered rales; he s:aid that from the pictures
it would be difficult to find that the silicosis is of sufficient severity to cause heart trouhle; that by themselves the pictures might leave some doubt. (R. 30, 32,
34, 3'5) Dr. Viko did not testify that his ~pictures disclosed small discrete nodules similarly disseminated
throughout both lungs, and Dr. Richards' testimony is
undisputed that the diffused nodulation throughout was
especiall1 in the right lung and only a moderate amount
in the left lung; that even if this is called silicosis, of
which he is doubtful, the amount is not sufficient to be
a cause of death. (R. 41, 43) ·Silicosis must be a chronic
disease of the lungs. Dr. Wherritt stated that up until
the last few months Mr. Mitchell app~eared to be normal
and active. (R. 22) He had not examined him for ten
years, and he died within six months after he first went
to see Dr. Wherritt. (R. 3, 21, 23) During all.the time
that Mr. Frantz had worked with him he was never ill
or had to lay off work. (R. 40) ·The pictures are here
and need only to be looked at to see that they h·ave no
resemblence whatever to a characteristic X-ray pattern
of silicosis, and that there is no nodulation showing the
same ap,pearance in both lungs.
The testimony of Dr. Richards as we have alre·ady
shown is positive, conclusive and largely undisputed. It
is unneccessary to rep~eat it. The Commission completely disregarded Dr. Richards' testimony and accepte·d the
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inconclusive testimony of Dr. Viko, which at the best
insufficient severity from the X-rays to cause death
shows only the possible existence of silicosis and that of
even according to his school of thought which is not
recognized by our statute. Mr. Peterson of the insurance comp1any is not disputed in his statement that the
death certificate which he actually saw contained no
reference to silicosis hut gave the cause of death as congestive heart failur'e. (R. 65, Exhibit 6)
We respectfu1ly submit that there is no substantial
competent evidence having p~rohative value to supPort
the findings of the Commission, that the X-rays themselves disclose that there is no silicosis present that
conforms to our statute. Undoubtedly, the Industrial
Commission has "<~los·ed its mind to the fact that the
Legislature considered this controversial question and·
adopted the definition of silicosis advocated by those
best informed on the subject. The Legislature excluded
the school of thought rep,resented by Dr. Viko that per~
mi ts a finding of p~roba;ble silicosis where there is not
present the elements required by our statute. The Commission should be required to conform to the statutory
definition of silicosis and not substitute its judgment
as to the p·resence or absence of silicosis in p·lace of the
judgment of the Legislature.
The evidence is not substantial and does not even
give "equal support to inconsistent inferences." Evidence is not substantial even though it gives equal sUlptSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
port to inconsistent inferences. App,alach.ian Elect'ric
Pou~er Co. vs. Nati.ovnal Labo.r Relat~ons B·o1ard, sup~ra.

II.
DID THE COl\In1ISSIO·N ABU·SE IT'S DIISICRE·TION
IN REFUSING AN AUT·O·P·SY IN THI:S CA·SE~
In this case as in Case No. 7172 the Commission
refused an autopsy although in both cases we knew nothing about the employee and never even heard of him
until after he was de-ad and buried. In case No. 7172
the Commission announced that its refusal was in deference to the wishes of the app~licant, but in the present
case it did not even give that as a reason. The Commission's action in this case was arbitrariness without any
semblance of pretense otherwise. In this case appears
the reason ·why we are never notified in these cases
until after the man is dead and buried, from the testimony of Mr. Peterson that the Secretary of the union
advised claimants generally in the· P·ark City area not
to report occupational disease until after the man has
died and then to refuse an autop~sy. (R. 46, 47) In both
cases after refusing an autopsy, which the record in
both cases discloses would have been conclusive, the
Commission disregarded the positive, uncontradicted evidence of the outstanding authority on the subje~ct and
made an ·award against us upon such fragments and
conclusions as it could draw from the record from witnesses whose testimony is obviously inferential at the
best.
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On point two our brief is largely the same in each
case because the p·rincip1e involved in each case is identical, and the comments and authorities on one case apply
with equal force to the other.
We have discussed the evidence in this case before
considering the question of the Commission's refusal of
an autopsy bec:ause it seems to us that the Commission's arbitariness appears clearly and irrefutably from
the decision it ma'de in the face of the re-cord. The Cnmmission as at present constituted aJpparently is of the
opinion that it is omnipotent and that it has absolute
power to take any action it sees fit to take regardless
of the circumstances. The C·ommission did not seek to
evaluate the facts judicially, but it ferreted out isolated
phrases upon the assumption we suppose that if there
were uttered any word or sentence, no matter upon what
flimsy or unstable foundation it rested, that word or
sentence might be the basis of a decision in this case.
The arbitrariness of the Commission is made so much
more manifest by its action in refusing an autopsy in
iboth this case and in No. 7172 that we cannot let the
matters pass. If we did, then not only is the autopsy
statute ~eaningless but substantial rights of parties before the Industrial Commission might ce·ase to exist.
It is true that the statute with reference to autopsy
is not couched in mandatory language. Neither, however,
is the Commission authorized to deny an autop,sy merely upon its own whim or caprice or upon the whim or
caprice of any one else. The statute says that in death
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cases fron1 an occupational disease ''where in the opinion of the Conlmission it is necessary to accurately and
scientifically ascertain the cause of death an autop·s.y
may be ordered by any mem·ber of the C'ommission.'' In
the present case the applicant seeks. to ·ex-act money
fron1 us upon the premise that her son died from an
occupational dise-ase. Surely she should not be allowe:d
to ask us for money upon the plea that her son died from
an occU1p1ational disease and at the same time deny us
access to the facts that would enab1e us to determine
whether or not he did die from such a disease. 'She
"\V""'as not too sensitive to a,sk us _for money, but when it
came to ·allowing us to determine whe'th'er he· did or not
die from silicosis she became· too sensitive to allow us to
investigate or discover that question. The very fact that
the Commission denied our right to an autopsy under
the facts present here itself disclos-es. an ·arbitrary and
capricious act on the part of the Industrial Commission.
It discloses that the opinion of the Commission was ndt
honestly and fairly exercised. The Commission·er h·ad
absolutely no basis for refusing an autop;sy. If Mrs.
Mitchell didn't want an autopsy and refused one, the
Legislature has s·aid that a he-aring should be suspended
and she should not be p·er:rni'tted to profit by her own act
in withholding evidence. The Industrial Commission a1lowed Mrs. Mitchell to prorfit at our exp·ense by denying us a right which we e·arnestly insist every fairminded
man would con sider we are entitled to have granted.
1

'There is nothing ·wrong with autopsies. ~courts have
appro~ed them in numerous cases as necessary and
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essential instrumentalities for securing the truth. Every
rule of evidence and every rule of law p1ertaining to
trials has been promulgated,. announced and enforced
throughout the centuries for the sole p~urpo1se of disclosing the .truth. In this ~as·e the lega1 machinery was
used by the Commission to conceal the truth. We never
even knew the man was sick until he was dead and buried.
We obtained all the ~evidence we could, and consulted
all the doctors who knew anything about the case to try
and determine the cause of the man's death. It could
not be determined. We were absolutely within our rights
in a!sking for an autopsy, and the Commission was completely arbitrary and capricious and not governed by
sound judicial diseretion in denying us an autopsy. ~t
is apparent from the record that an autopsy no doubt
would have disclosed positively that Mr. Mitchell did
not die from silicosis. But instead of requiring the applicant to p~rove her case and placing the burden of proof
upon her, the Commission joined with her in denying us
a positive test that would establish without doubt her
right or her lack of right to recover. The Commission
also accepted con'jecture and surmise, against the positive
evidence of the only qualified person who testified, in
its struggle to aid this applicant-not to aid her to
secure her rights, hut to aid hHr b~ dep~riving us of our
rights.
M~any

cases have considered the question of the~
propriety of an autop·sy. There are none that we have
been able to find that come under a statute similar to
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surance policies giVIng the insurer the right to an
autopsy. However, the right to a physical examination
in cases where the physical condition of the plaintiff i'S
an issue is sustained by the great majority of American
courts upon the principle to which we referred abovethat the purpose of a trial is to de~te·rmine the truth,
and when the p·laintiff's physical condition or that of the
plaintiff's decedent, is in issue, the rig:q:t of the defen·dant
to a physical examination arises as a matter of right ·e·ven
in the absence of statutory provision therefor. Both the
Workmen's C·ompensation .Act and the Occup,ational Disease statute give this right beyond question, (42-1-85,
42-la-46).
The Kansas court in Howard vs. Hwrtford .A.ccid'ent
and Indemnity Compa;ny (i1934) 32 Pac. ('2) 231, held
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in appointing at the request of the insurer a commission of
physicians for the purpos·e of examining the insured's
injured eye where the insure-d objecte·d to the testimony
of a private physician who had previou~sly .examined his
eye, on the groun.d that the examination was pTivileged.
In M~eyers vs. Trovelers' InsurOIJ'IAce Comp'OJYIIY (Pa. 1946)
46 A. (2) 224, the court held that indep·endently of any
provision in the policy of insurance the court may order
a physical examination of the insured, and it is not an
unlawful invasion of his rights to require such an examination aided by stethescope, X-·ray, .etc. The remedy if
the examination is refused by the p[aintiff is to dismiss
his case. It would se·em to require no extended argument
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to conclude that when a person seeks to reeover because
of the physical condition of himself or another he should
not he allowed to block and prevent any reasonable examination that will dis'Close that person's true condition.
The courts have sustained the right of autopsy and
find nothing repugnant in it, p'articularly when the
autopsy will disclose the truth of the matter undeT inquiry. For instance in Starndard Accident Insvwranc:e Company vs. Rossi, 35 Fed. (2) 66'7, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed because an ·autopsy was refused. Of
courS"e the po1icy provided for an autopsy, but the principle announced by the case is ap·plica:bJ·e here. The court
said: ( 672)
"From the foregoing it appears that there was
substantial evidence to the effect that an autopsy
might very probably have disclosed the cause of
death, and that the condition of the body at the
time the demand was, made would not neces·sarily,
nor even probably, have prevented such dis·closure.
* * * The refusal to grant it was such a breach
of the insurance contract as would ~preclude recovery by appellee.' '

In Howes vs. United States Fidelity & Gwaroot.ee
Comp1any, 73 Fed. (2) 611, the Ninth Circuit Court at
page 612 said:
'':Since there is no dispute in the instance case
as to the facts and circumstances under which the
demand for an autop·s.y was made, and no doubt
that such autopsy would have 'positively' established the cause of de·ath, we believe that the
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effect of the refusal of the beneficiary to con.
sent to an autopsy presented 'a question of law
for the court, rather than a question of fact for
the jury'."* • • (613) "When the insurance company h'as no information regarding the death or
the cause thereof until after the body has been
buried and there is reason to believe the postmortenl examination will disclose facts which will
release the company from liability, it may be just
and prover to hold an autopsy even after burial.''
That court also rej·ected the argument that provisions for
an autop·sy are in great disfavor with the courts with
this statement which is also applicable here: ''In this
case, the Company had no knowledge of th·e death of the
insur~d until after the body was interred." ('613) And
the court also said on this point with reference to the
'argument that courts disfavor autopsy: ''It has had no
reference to post-mor'tem examinations for the purpose
of detecting the commission of crime or of fraud or ilnjustice in civil proceedings." (61'3) (Italics added) In
Clay vs . .A·etna Life Insurance Comp1any, 53 Fe·d. (2)
689 (Minn. D. Cnnrt), Judge Sanborn a1so discusses the
prop·riety of autop·sy and quotes from th.e case of WhitehoUSte vs. T'r!avelers' lnsru;'rlwnce Compan;y at page 693 as
follows:
''·The necessity of the provi,sion in accident
policies that insurer shall have the right to make
an autopsy can be seen 'wh·ere a man might die
and he buri'e·d, and it be alle,ged afterward that
the death was caused by accident, whereas, if an
autop·sy had been made, it might have been shown
otherwise'.''
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The court exp·ressly decl!ared that there was no public
policy against autopsy under circumstances such as are
pres·ent heire.
'The Indus'trial .Commission app,arently proceeded
upon the assumption that it had the absolute right with.:.
out rhyme or reason to refuse an autop'Sy and tlrat the
plaintiffs hHre had no rights or remedy wh!atever in the
matter. We do not so concede the law to be. The Industrial Commission at the most had only the right to
exercise a sound judicial discre tion. The statute itself
p·ermits the Commission when in its opinion it is necessary to accurately and scientificaTiy deter.mine the cause
of death to order an autopsy. That opinion must he based
upon legi'timate reasons. We do not concede the law to
give the c·ommission the right to say ''in our opinion
it was not necessary" when the record discloses, as it
does here, that an autopsy is necess'ary and conclusive
and that witholit it there is nothing but speculation, conjecture and inference to support the award of the Com1

. .

IDlSSlOn.

The Commission was required to act honestly, fairly and justly. What constitutes a sound discretion has
been judicially discussed on many occasions and this
court also hol'ds in line with the· authorities "'That an
abuse of discretion may be reviewed is established by
the authorities.'' Salt Lake ·City vs. Anl.Ze~Siofn, 106 Utah
3'50, 361, 148 Pac. (2) 346.
Citation of a few of the cas-es dis·cussing judicial discre'tion may be of value to the court in this case. There
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is no dissent from the p1rinciples announced in the following cases : Th·e Rhode Island Supreme 'Court in ~Stlr1ze
binska vs. Jary, 193 A. 7±5, defines judicial diseretion as
follows: ''~stated in general terms 'judicial discretion'
means sound discretion, exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with just regard to what is right and .equitable
under the circumstances and the law.'' The Sup1reme
Court of Iowa in Arthood vs. Grtiffin, 217 N.W. 809, approved several definitions, al1 of which amount t'O the
same thing, as follows:
"Judicial discretion is a phrase of great
latitude; but it never means the arbitrary will of
the judge. * * * It is a legal discretion foun·ded ·
upon conditions which call for judicial action as
distinguishe·d from mere individual or personal
view or desire.''

And from 18 C. J. page lt35, Sec. 3:
''However incapable of exact ·definition, it
is clearly recognized that discretion is not absolutely without elements, conditions, or limitations. T·he term implies the a~bsence of a hard
and fast rule, yet it should not he another word
for' arbitrary will', 'inconsiderate action', or 'unstable caprice'."
In Lee vs. Baltimo~e Hotel Compall'll!J, 1'36 S.W. ('2)
69'5, the Missouri Supreme C:~urlt s·aid:
'''We have said that such a discretion does not'
mean a mere whim or caprice, but it m·eans an
honest a;ttempt, in the exercise of a judge in his
duty and power to see that justice is done, to
establish a legal right.''
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In the case now before us the Commission knew that
we had never heard of this case until the man was dead
and buried. The Commission knew that the medical evidence was hazy; that we had evidenced a willingness to
pay if it was demonstrated that the decease·d died as a
result of silicosis; that autopsy was now the only way
we could get this information. The Commission knew
that we had talked to all the doctors and knew what they
had told us. In spite of this and for no reason whatever
an autopsy was refused. Then on the basis of such hazy
evidence and in the absence of an autopsy an award was
made against us allowing the applicant to profit by refusing us a reasonable, justifiable and honest request to
secure information which, without question, would have
established whether or not the ap,plicant was entitled
to comp~ensation. The Commission used it's power to
thwart justice not to promote it; i't used its power to
conceal eiVidence not to bring it to light; it used its power
arbitrarily and cap·riciously and inexcusably discriminated against us in this proce·eding. Then the Commis·sion disregarded substantial and convincing evidence in
order to find some basis upon which to make an award
against us when true and positive evidence lay locked
in the vault with the keys in the hands of the Commission. 'They refused to open the vault. We submit that
the Industrial Commission flagrantly abused its discretion in this case, and the award should not stand.
We also call to the court's attention the wording of
the award. As we understand the statute (~2-l'a-25) as
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amended, (1945) compensation when properly awarded
is payable at the rate of $16.00 plus p,er week with a certain maximum beyond which it cann·ot go. In the event
of death or remarriage of a dependent the compensation
ceases or is diminished. In this case, however, the Commission awards the maximum, (R. 13), regardless of any
contingency that may happen in the future, whereas, in
our judgment it should have awarded weekly payments
in accordance with the statute not to exceed the allow~ble maximum. The Commission made no finding whatever that Mrs. Mitchell is a dependent. There is nothing
in the record to show that she was dependent. She testified that she owned her own home, she bought her own
clothes. After the death of her son she put in a te1ephone, and she paid the lights. She receives money from
social security or public welfare. Her son bought her
food and his food. What that amounted to does not appear. He paid the taxe's on the house, and at some time
in the past had d'one something towards remodeling it,
whether by means of money or his own work does not
appear, nor does it appear of what the remodeling c·onsisted. We think that it would be impossible for a fairminded p·erson to hold that this applicant was de·pendent
upon her son. Certainly, there is no evidence in this
record to support such a finding, and in fact there i·s
no such finding. T he award is not sup·piorted by any
finding whatever in this case, nor is there any evidence
to support the funeral, medical or hospital expenses
awarded. It may be that these matters are technical and
not the real vice of these cases. But the Commission
1
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persists in making its awards In this fashion, and to
avoi·d complications that might arise We· submit that the
award shou1·d conform with the statute. If the dependent
died or remarried, there might be an argument that the
award in a total sum was a judgment and had become
final and not subje·ct to review and the employer might
be confronted with improper demands because of the
form of the award.
For the foregoing reasons we submit that the award
of the c~ommission should be set as·ide and annuHed.
Respectfully submitted,

SiHIRL,EY P. JONE S
1

Attorney

~or Plaimt~ffs.
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